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Abstract
Ex ante forecast outcomes should be interpreted as counterfactuals (potential histories), with
errors as the spread between outcomes. Reapplying measurements of uncertainty about the
estimation errors of the estimation errors of an estimation leads to branching counterfactuals.
Such recursions of epistemic uncertainty have markedly different distributial properties from
conventional sampling error. Nested counterfactuals of error rates invariably lead to fat tails,
regardless of the probability distribution used, and to powerlaws under some conditions. A
mere .01% branching error rate about the STD (itself an error rate), and .01% branching error
rate about that error rate, etc. (recursing all the way) results in explosive (and infinite) higher
moments  than  1.  Missing  any  degree  of  regress  leads  to  the  underestimation  of  small
probabilities and concave payoffs (a standard example of which is Fukushima).  The paper
states the conditions under which higher order rates of uncertainty (expressed in spreads of
counterfactuals) alters the shapes the of final distribution and shows which a priori  beliefs
about conterfactuals are needed to accept the reliability of conventional probabilistic methods
(thin tails or mildly fat tails). 
KEYWORDS: Fukushima,  Counterfactual  histories,  Risk management,  Epistemology of  probability,  Model  errors,  Fragility and
Antifragility, Fourth Quadrant
Introduction
Intuition. An event has never shown in past samples; we are told that it was “estimated” as having zero probability. But an estima-
tion has to have an error rate; only measures deemed a priori or fallen from the sky and dictated by some infaillible deity can escape
such error.  Since probabilities  cannot  be  negative,  the  estimation error  will  necessarily  put  a  lower  bound on it  and make the
probability > 0. 
This, in a nutschell, is how we should treat the convexity bias stemming from uncertainty about small probabilities. Using the same
reasoning, we need to increase the raw “estimation” of small probabilities. There can be uncertainty about the relationship between
past samples and future ones, or, more philosophically, from the problem of induction.  Doubting the reliability of the methods used
to produce these probabilities,  or doubting beliefs about the future resembling the past will lend us to exercise standard skepticism
and consider a spate of different alternative future outcomes.  The small probability event will necessarily have, in expectation, i.e.,
on average across all potential future histories, a higher than what was measured. The increase in the probability will be commensu-
rate with the error rate in the estimation. It, simply, results from the convexity bias that makes small probabilities rise when we are
uncertain about them. Accordingly, the future needs to be dealt with as having thicker tails than what was measured in the past.
Incoherence in Probabilistic Measurements. Just as "estimating" an event to be of measure 0 is incoherent, it is equally inconsis-
tent to estimate anything without introducing an estimation error in the analysis and adding a convexity bias (positive or negative).
But this incoherence (or confusion between estimated and a priori) pervades the economics literature whenever probabilistic and
statistical methods are used.  For instance, the highest use of probabiltiy in modern financial economics resulting from the seminal
Markowitz (1952) has his derivations starting with assuming E and V (expectation and variance). At the end of the paper he states
that these parameters need to be estimated. Injecting an estimation error in the analysis entirely cancel the  derivations of the paper as
they are based on immutable certainties.
Regressing Counterfactuals
We can go beyond probabilities and, in place of probabilities, perturbate parameters of probability distributions used in practice and
perturbate the rates of perturbation. So this paper introduces two notions: treating errors as branching counterfactual histories and
regressing  (i.e.,  compounding)  the  error  rates.  An error  rate  about  a  forecast  can  be  estimated  (or,  of  course,  "guessed").  The
estimation (or "guess"), in turn, will have an error rate. The estimation of such error rate will have an error rate. (The forecast can be
an economic variable, the future rainfall in Brazil, or the damage from  a nuclear accident).  
We can go beyond probabilities and, in place of probabilities, perturbate parameters of probability distributions used in practice and
perturbate the rates of perturbation. So this paper introduces two notions: treating errors as branching counterfactual histories and
regressing  (i.e.,  compounding)  the  error  rates.  An error  rate  about  a  forecast  can  be  estimated  (or,  of  course,  "guessed").  The
estimation (or "guess"), in turn, will have an error rate. The estimation of such error rate will have an error rate. (The forecast can be
an economic variable, the future rainfall in Brazil, or the damage from  a nuclear accident).  
What is called a regress argument by philosophers can be used to put some scrutiny on  quantitative methods or risk and probability.
The mere existence of such regress argument will lead to series of branching counterfactuals three different regimes, two of which
lead to the necessity to raise the values of small probabilities, and one of them to the necessity to use power law distributions. This
study of the structures of the error rates refines the analysis of the  Fourth Quadrant (Taleb, 2008) setting the limit of the possibility
of the use of probabilistic methods (and their reliability in the decision-making), based on errors in the tails of the distribution.
So the boundary between the regimes is what this paper is about -what assumptions one needs to have set beforehand to avoid radical
skepticism and which specific a priori undefeasable beliefs are necessary to hold for that. In other words someone using probabilistic
estimates should tell us beforehand which immutable certainties are built into his representation, and what should be subjected to
error -and regress --otherwise they risk falling into a certain form of incoherence: if a parameter is estimated, second order effects
need to be considered.
This paper can also help setting a wedge between forecasting and statistical estimation.
The Regress Argument (Error about Error)
The main problem behind The Black Swan  is the limited understanding of model (or representation) error, and, for those who get it, a
lack of understanding of second order errors (about the methods used to compute the errors) and by a regress argument, an inability
to continuously reapplying the thinking all the way to its limit (particularly when they provide no reason to stop).  Again, I have no
problem with stopping the recursion, provided it is accepted as a declared a priori that escapes quantitative and statistical methods.
Also, few get the point that the skepticism in The Back Swan it does not invalidate all measurements of probability; its value lies in
showing a map of domains that are vulnerable to such opacity,  defining these domains based on their propensity to fat-tailedness (of
end outcomes),  sensitivity to convexity effects,  and building robustness (i.e.,  mitigation of tail  effects)  by appropriate decision-
making rules. 
Philosophers  and Regress  Arguments:  I  was  having  a  conversation  with  the  philosopher  Paul  Boghossian  about  errors  in  the
assumptions of a model (or its  structure) not being customarily included back into the model itself  when I realized that only a
philosopher can understand a problem to which the entire quantitative field seems blind. For instance, probability professionals do
not include in the probabilistic measurement itself an error rate about, say, the estimation of a parameter provided by an expert, or
other uncertainties attending the computations.  This would only be acceptable if they consciously accepted such limit.
Unlike philosophers, quantitative risk professionals (“quants”) don't seem to remotely get regress arguments; questioning all the way
(without making a stopping assumption) is foreign to them (what I’ve called scientific autism, the kind of scientific autism that got us
into so many mistakes in finance and risk management situations such as the problem with the Fukushima reactor). Just reapplying
layers of uncertainties may show convexity biases, and, fortunately, it does not necessarily kill probability theory; it just disciplines
the use of some distributions, at the expense of others --distributions in the  L2 norm (i.e., square integrable) are no longer valid, for
epistemic reasons.  This is does not mean we cannot have paremetric distributions; it just means that when there is no structure to the
error rates we need to stay in the power law domains, even if the data does not give us reasons for that.
The bad news is that this recursion of the error rate invalidates all common measures of small probabilitites --and has the effect of
raising them.
Indeed, the conversation with the philosopher was quite a relief as I had a hard time discussing with quants and risk persons the point
that without understanding errors, a measure is nothing and one should take the point to its logical consequence that any measure of
error needs to have its own error taken into account. 
The epistemic  and counterfactual  aspect  of  standard deviations:  One sad  conversation  took place  a  decade  ago with  another
academic, a professor of risk management who writes papers on Value at Risk (and still does): he could not get that the standard
deviation of a distribution for future outcomes (and not the sampling of some properties of existing population), the measure of
dispersion, needs to be interpreted as the measure of uncertainty, distance between counterfactuals, hence epistemic, and that it, in
turn, should necessarily have uncertainties (errors) attached to it (unless he accepted infallibility of belief in such measure). One
needs to look at the standard deviation -or other measures of dispersion -as a degree of ignorance about the future realizations of the
process. The higher the uncertainty, the higher the measure of dispersion (variance, mean deviation, etc.) 
Such uncertainty,  by Jensen’s  inequality,  creates  non-negligible convexity biases.  So far  this  is  well  known in places in which
subordinated processes have been used --for instance stochastic variance models  --but I have not seen the layering of uncertainties
taken into account.
Betting on Rare Events: Finally, this note explains my main points about betting on rare events. Do I believe that the probability of
the event is higher? No. I believe that any additional layer of uncertainty raises the payoff from such probability (because of convex-
ity effects); in other words, a mistake in one direction is less harmful than the benefits in the other --and this paper has the derivations
to show it.
Note: Counterfactuals, Estimation of the Future v/s Sampling Problem
Note that it  is hard to escape higher order uncertainties,  even outside of the use of counterfactual:  even when sampling from a
conventional population, an error rate can come from the production of information (such as: is the information about the sample size
correct? is the information correct and reliable?), etc. These higher order errors exist and could be severe in the event of convexity to
parameters, but they are qualitatively different with forecasts concerning events that have not taken place yet. 
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This discussion is about an epistemic situation that is markedly different from a sampling problem as treated conventionally by the
statistical community, particularly the Bayesian one. In the classical case of sampling by Gosset (“Student”, 1908) from a normal
distribution with an unknown variance (Fisher, 1925), the Student T Distribution (itself a power law) arises for the estimated mean
since  the  square  of  the  variations  (deemed Gaussian)  will  be  Chi-square  distributed.  The  initial  situation  is  one  of  completely
unknown variance, but that is progressively discovered through sampling; and the degrees of freedom (from an increase in sample
size) rapidly shrink the tails involved in the underlying distribution. 
The case here is the exact opposite, as we have an a priori approach with no data: we start with a known priorly estimated or
"guessed" standard deviation, but with an unknown error on it expressed as a spread of branching outcomes, and, given the a priori
aspect of the exercise, we have no sample increase helping us to add to the information and shrink the tails. We just deal with nested
counterfactuals.
Note that given that, unlike the Gosset’s situation, we have a finite mean (since we don’t hold it to be stochastic and know it a priori)
hence we necessarily end in a situation of finite first moment (hence escape the Cauchy distribution), but, as we will see, a more
complicated second moment. 
See the discussion of the Gosset and Fisher approach in Chapter 1 of Mosteller and Tukey (1977). [I thank Andrew Gelman and
Aaron Brown for the discussion].
Main Results
Note that unless one stops the branching at an early stage, all the results raise small probabilities (in relation to their remoteness; the
more remote the event, the worse the relative effect). 
1. Under the regime of proportional constant (or increasing) recursive layers of uncertainty about rates of uncertainty, the 
distribution has infinite variance, even when one starts with a standard Gaussian.
2. Under the other regime, where the errors are decreasing (proportionally) for higher order errors, the ending distribution becomes 
fat-tailed but in a benign way as it retains its finite variance attribute (as well as all higher moments), allowing convergence to 
Gaussian under Central Limit.
3. We manage to set a boundary between these two regimes.
4. In both regimes the use of a thin-tailed distribution is not warranted unless higher order errors can be completely eliminated a 
priori.
Epistemic not statistical re-derivation of power laws: Note that previous derivations of power laws have been statistical (cumulative
advantage, preferential attachment, winner-take-all effects, criticality), and the properties derived by Yule, Mandelbrot, Zipf, Simon,
Bak, and others result from structural conditions or breaking the independence assumptions in the sums of random variables allowing
for the application of the central limit theorem. This work is entirely epistemic, based on standard philosophical doubts and regress
arguments.
Methods and Derivations
Layering Uncertainties
The idea is to hunt for convexity effects from the layering of higher order uncertainties (Taleb, 1997).
Take a standard probability distribution, say the Gaussian.  The measure of dispersion, here s, is estimated, and we need to attach
some measure of dispersion around it. The uncertainty about the rate of uncertainty, so to speak, or higher order parameter, similar to
what called the "volatility of volatility" in the lingo of option operators (see Taleb, 1997, Derman, 1994,  Dupire, 1994, Hull and
White, 1997) --here it would be "uncertainty rate about the uncertainty rate". And there is no reason to stop there:  we can keep
nesting these uncertainties into higher orders, with the uncertainty rate of the uncertainty rate of the uncertainty rate, and so forth.
There is no reason to have certainty anywhere in the process.
Now, for that very reason, this paper shows that, in the absence of knowledge about the structure of higher orders of deviations, we
are forced to use a power-law tails. Most derivations of power law tails have focused on processes (Zipf-Simon preferential attach-
ment, cumulative advantage, entropy maximization under constraints, etc.) Here we just derive them using lack of knowledge about
the rates of knowledge.
Higher order integrals in the Standard Gaussian Case
We start with the case of a Gaussian and focus the uncertainty on the assumed standard deviation. Define f(m,s,x) as the Gaussian
density function for value x with mean m and standard deviation s.
A 2ndorder stochastic standard deviation is the integral of f across values of s œ ]0,¶[, under the measure f Hs, s1, sL,  with s1 its
scale parameter (our approach to trach the error of the error), not necessarily its standard deviation; the expected value of  s1 is  s1. 
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(1)f HxL1 = ‡
0
¶
fHm, s, xL f Hs, s1, sL „s
Generalizing to the Nth order, the density function f(x) becomes
(2)f HxLN = ‡
0
¶
... ‡
0
¶
fHm, s, xL f Hs, s1, sL f Hs1, s2, s1L ... f HsN-1, sN , sN-1L „s „s1 „s2 ... „sN
The problem is that this approach is parameter-heavy and requires the specifications of the subordinated distributions (in finance, the
lognormal has been traditionally used for s2 (or Gaussian for the ratio Log[ st2
s2
] since the direct use of a Gaussian allows for negative
values). We would need to specify a measure f for each layer of error rate. Instead this can be approximated by using the mean
deviation for s, as we will see next.
Note that branching variance does not always result in higher Kurtosis (4th moment) compared to the Gaussian; in the case of N-2,
using the Gaussian and stochasticzing both m and s will lead to bimodality the lowering of the 4th moment.
Discretization using nested series of two-states for s- a simple multiplicative process
A  quite  effective  simplification  to  capture  the  convexity,  the  ratio  of  (or  difference  between)  f(m,s,x)   andŸ0¶fHm, s, xL f Hs, s1, sL „s (the first order standard deviation) would be to use a weighted average of values of s, say, for  a
simple case of one-order stochastic volatility:  
s H1 ± a H1LL, 0 § a H1L < 1
where a(1) is the proportional mean absolute deviation for s, in other word the measure of the absolute error rate for s. We use 12 as
the probability of each state.
Thus the distribution using the first order stochastic standard deviation can be expressed as:
(3)f HxL1 = 12 8f Hm, s H1 + aH1LL, xL + f Hm, sH1 - aH1LL, xL<
Illustration of the Convexity Effect: Figure 1 shows the convexity effect of a(1) for a probability of exceeding the deviation of x=6.
With a[1]= 15 , we can see the effect of multiplying the probability by 7.
1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 STD
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
P>x
Figure 1 Illustration of he convexity bias for a Gaussian raising small probabilities: The plot shows the STD effect on P>x, and compares P>6 
with a STD of 1.5 compared to P> 6 assuming a linear combination of 1.2 and 1.8 (here a(1)=1/5). 
Now assume uncertainty about the error rate a(1), expressed by a(2), in the same manner as before. Thus in place of a(1) we have 12
a(1)( 1± a(2)).
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sH1-aH1LLs
HaH1L+1Ls
HaH1L+1L H1-aH2LLs
HaH1L+1L HaH2L+1Ls
H1-aH1LL H1-aH2LLs
H1-aH1LL HaH2L+1Ls
H1-aH1LL H1-aH2LL H1-aH3LLs
H1-aH1LL HaH2L+1L H1-aH3LLs
HaH1L+1L H1-aH2LL H1-aH3LLs
HaH1L+1L HaH2L+1L H1-aH3LLs
H1-aH1LL H1-aH2LL HaH3L+1Ls
H1-aH1LL HaH2L+1L HaH3L+1Ls
HaH1L+1L H1-aH2LL HaH3L+1Ls
HaH1L+1L HaH2L+1L HaH3L+1Ls
Figure 2- Three levels of error rates for s following a multiplicative process
The second order stochastic standard deviation:
(4)f HxL2 = 14 8fHm, sH1 + aH1L H1 + aH2LLL, xL +
fHm, sH1 - aH1L H1 + aH2LLL, xL + fHm, sH1 + aH1L H1 - aH2LL, xL + f Hm, sH1 - aH1L H1 - aH2LLL, xL<
and the Nth order:
(5)f HxL N = 12N ‚i=12N fIm, s MiN , xM
where  MiN   is the ith scalar (line)  of the matrix MN I2N µ 1M
(6)MN = :‰
j=1
N Ha HjL TPi, jT + 1L>
i=1
2N
and T[[i,j]]  the element  of ithline and jthcolumn of the matrix of the exhaustive combination of N-Tuples of (-1,1),that is the N-
dimentionalvector {1,1,1,...} representing all combinations of 1 and -1.
for N=3
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T =
1 1 1
1 1 -1
1 -1 1
1 -1 -1
-1 1 1
-1 1 -1
-1 -1 1
-1 -1 -1
and M3 =
H1 - aH1LL H1 - aH2LL H1 - aH3LLH1 - aH1LL H1 - aH2LL HaH3L + 1LH1 - aH1LL HaH2L + 1L H1 - aH3LLH1 - aH1LL HaH2L + 1L HaH3L + 1LHaH1L + 1L H1 - aH2LL H1 - aH3LLHaH1L + 1L H1 - aH2LL HaH3L + 1LHaH1L + 1L HaH2L + 1L H1 - aH3LLHaH1L + 1L HaH2L + 1L HaH3L + 1L
so M13 = 8H1 - aH1LL H1 - aH2LL H1 - aH3LL<, etc.
Figure 3, Thicker tails (higher peaks) for higher values of N; here N=0,5,10,25,50,  all values of a= 1
10
A remark seems necessary at this point: the various error rates a(i) are not similar to sampling errors, but rather projection of error
rates into the future.
Note: we are assuming here, that s is stochastic with steps (1± a(n)), not s2. An alternative method would be the mixture with a
"low" variance  Hs H1 - vLL2  and a "high" one s -v2 + 2 v + 1 2  selecting a single v so that s2  remains the same in expectation.
With 1 >v¥0, the total standard deviation.
The Final Mixture Distribution
The mixture weighted average distribution (recall that f is the ordinary Gaussian with mean m, std s and the random variable x). 
(7)f Hx m, s, M , NL = 2-N ‚
i=1
2N
fIm, s MiN , x M
Note: It could be approximated by a lognormal distribution for s and the corresponding V as its own variance. But it is precisely 
the V that interest us, and V depends on how higher order errors behave. 
Next let us consider the different regimes for higher order errors.
Regime 1 (Explosive): Case of a Constant parameter a
Special case of constant a: Assume that a(1)=a(2)=...a(N)=a, i.e. the case of flat proportional error rate a. The Matrix M collapses
into a conventional binomial tree for the dispersion at the level N.
(8)f Hx m, s, M , NL = 2-N ‚
j=0
N K Nj O fIm, s Ha + 1L j H1 - aLN- j, xM
Because of the linearity of the sums, when a is constant, we can use the binomial distribution as weights for the moments (note again
the artificial effect of constraining the first moment m in the analysis to a set, certain, and known a priori).
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Moment
m
s2 Ha2 + 1LN + m2
3 m s2 Ha2 + 1LN + m3
6 m2 s2 Ha2 + 1LN + m4 + 3 Ha4 + 6 a2 + 1LN s4
10 m3 s2 Ha2 + 1LN + m5 + 15 Ha4 + 6 a2 + 1LN m s4
15 m4 s2 Ha2 + 1LN + m6 + 15 HHa2 + 1L Ha4 + 14 a2 + 1LLN s6 + 45 Ha4 + 6 a2 + 1LN m2 s4
21 m5 s2 Ha2 + 1LN + m7 + 105 HHa2 + 1L Ha4 + 14 a2 + 1LLN m s6 + 105 Ha4 + 6 a2 + 1LN m3 s4
m6 s2 Ha2 + 1LN + m8 + 105 Ha8 + 28 a6 + 70 a4 + 28 a2 + 1LN s8 + 420 HHa2 + 1L Ha4 + 14 a2 + 1LLN m2 s6 + 210 Ha4 + 6 a2 + N
For clarity, we simplify the table of moments, with m=0
Order Moment
1 0
2 Ha2 + 1LN s2
3 0
4 3 Ha4 + 6 a2 + 1LN s4
5 0
6 15 Ha6 + 15 a4 + 15 a2 + 1LN s6
7 0
8 105 Ha8 + 28 a6 + 70 a4 + 28 a2 + 1LN s8
Note again the oddity that in spite of the explosive nature of higher moments, the expectation of the absolute value of x is both
independent of a and N, since the perturbations of s do not affect the first absolute moment Ÿ x f HxL „x= 2
p
s (that is, the
initial assumed s). The situation would be different under addition of x.
Every recursion multiplies the variance of the process by (1+a2).  The process is similar to a stochastic volatility model, with the
standard deviation (not the variance) following a lognormal distribution, the volatility of which grows with M, hence will reach
infinite variance at the limit.
Consequences
For a constant a > 0, and in the more general case with variable a where a(n) ¥ a(n-1),  the moments explode.
A- Even the smallest value of a >0, since I1 + a2MN  is unbounded,  leads to the second moment going to infinity (though not 
the first) when NØ¶. So something as small as a .001% error rate will still lead to explosion of moments and invalidation of the 
use of the class of  L2 distributions.
B- In these conditions, we need to use  power laws for epistemic reasons, or, at least, distributions outside the L2 norm, 
regardless of observations of past data.
Note that we need an a priori reason (in the philosophical sense) to cutoff the N somewhere, hence bound the expansion of the
second moment.
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Convergence to Properties Similar to Power Laws
We can see on the example next Log-Log plot (Figure 1) how, at higher orders of stochastic volatility, with equally proportional
stochastic coefficient, (where a(1)=a(2)=...=a(N)= 110 )  how the density approaches that of a power law (just like the Lognormal
distribution at higher variance), as shown in flatter density on the LogLog plot.  The probabilities keep rising in the tails  as we add
layers of uncertainty until they seem to reach the boundary of the power law, while ironically the first moment remains invariant.
10.05.02.0 20.03.0 30.01.5 15.07.0 Log x
10-13
10-10
10-7
10-4
0.1
Log PrHxL a=
1
10
, N=0,5,10,25,50
Figure x - LogLog Plot of the probability of exceeding x showing power law-style flattening as N rises. Here all values of a= 1/10
The same effect takes place as a increases towards 1, as at the limit the tail exponent P>x approaches 1 but remains >1.
Effect on Small Probabilities
Next we measure the effect on the thickness of the tails. The obvious effect is the rise of small probabilities.
Take the exceedant probability, that is, the probability of exceeding K, given N, for parameter a constant :
(9)P > K N =‚
j=0
N
2-N-1 K Nj O erfc K2 s Ha + 1L j H1 - aLN- j
where erfc(.) is the complementary of the error function, 1-erf(.), erfHzL = 2
p
Ÿ0ze-t2 dt
Convexity effect:The next Table shows the ratio of exceedant probability under different values of N divided by the probability in
the case of a standard Gaussian.
a = 1100
N P>3,NP>3,N=0
P>5,N
P>5,N=0
P>10,N
P>10,N=0
5 1.01724 1.155 7
10 1.0345 1.326 45
15 1.05178 1.514 221
20 1.06908 1.720 922
25 1.0864 1.943 3347
a = 110
N P>3,NP>3,N=0
P>5,N
P>5,N=0
P>10,N
P>10,N=0
5 2.74 146 1.09µ1012
10 4.43 805 8.99µ1015
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15 5.98 1980 2.21µ1017
20 7.38 3529 1.20µ1018
25 8.64 5321 3.62µ1018
Regime 2: Cases of decaying parameters a(n)
As we said, we may have (actually we need to have) a priori reasons to decrease the parameter a or stop N somewhere. When the
higher order of a(i) decline, then the moments tend to be capped (the inherited tails will come from the lognormality of s).
Regime 2-a; First Method: “bleed” of higher order error
Take a "bleed" of higher order errors at the rate l,  0§ l < 1 , such as a(N) = l  a(N-1), hence a(N) = lN a(1), with a(1) the conven-
tional intensity of stochastic standard deviation. Assume m=0.
With N=2 , the second moment becomes:
(10)M2H2L = IaH1L2 + 1Ms2 IaH1L2 l2 + 1M
With N=3,
(11)M2H3L = s2 I1 + aH1L2M I1 + l2 aH1L2M I1 + l4 aH1L2M
finally, for the general N:
(12)M3HNL = IaH1L2 + 1Ms2 ‰
i=1
N-1 IaH1L2 l2 i + 1M
We can reexpress H12L using the Q - Pochhammer symbol Ha; qLN = ‰
i=1
N-1 I1 - aqiM
(13)M2HNL = s2 I-aH1L2; l2MN
Which allows us to get to the limit
(14)Limit M2 HNLNØ¶ = s2 Hl2; l2L2 HaH1L2; l2L¶Hl2 - 1L2 Hl2 + 1L
As to the fourth moment:
By recursion:
(15)M4HNL = 3 s4 ‰
i=0
N-1 I6 aH1L2 l2 i + aH1L4 l4 i + 1M
(16)M4HNL = 3 s4 KK2 2 - 3O aH1L2; l2O
N
K-K3 + 2 2 O aH1L2; l2O
N
(17)Limit M4H NLNØ¶ = 3 s4 KK2 2 - 3O aH1L2; l2O
¶
K-K3 + 2 2 O aH1L2; l2O
¶
So the limiting second moment for l=.9 and a(1)=.2 is just 1.28 s2, a significant but relatively benign convexity bias. The limiting
fourth moment is just 9.88 s4,  more than 3 times the Gaussian’s (3 s4), but still finite fourth moment. For small values of a and
values of l close to 1, the fourth moment collapses to that of a Gaussian.
Regime 2-b; Second Method, a Non Multiplicative Error Rate
For N recursions
s H1 ± HaH1L H1 ± H a H2L H1 ± aH3L H ... LLL
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(18)PHx, m, s, NL = ⁄i=1L f Hx, m, s H1 + H TN . AN LiL
LIMN .T + 1Mi is the ith component of the HN ä1L dot product of TN the matrix of Tuples in H6L ,
L the length of the matrix, and A is the vector of parameters
AN = 9a j= j=1,... N
So for instance, for N=3, T= {1, a, a2, a3}
T3. A3 =
a + a2 + a3
a + a2 - a3
a - a2 + a3
a - a2 - a3
-a + a2 + a3
-a + a2 - a3
-a - a2 + a3
-a - a2 - a3
The moments are as follows:
(19)M1HNL = m
(20)M2HNL = m2 + 2 s
(21)M4HNL = m4 + 12 m2 s + 12 s2‚
i=0
N
a2 i
at the limit of N Ø¶
(22)Lim NØ¶ M4HNL = m4 + 12 m2 s + 12 s2 11 - a2
which is very mild.
Conclusions and Open Questions
So far we examined two regimes, one in which the higher order errors are proportionally constant, the other one in which we can
allow them to decline. The difference between the two is easy to spot: the first category corresponds to naturally thin-tailed  domains
(higher errors decline rapidly), something very rare on mother earth. Outside of these very special situations (say in some strict
applications or clear cut sampling problems from a homogeneous population, or similar matters stripped of higher order uncertain-
ties), the Gaussian and its siblings (along with the measures such as STD, correlation, etc.) should be completely abandoned, along
with any attempt to measure small probabilities. So the power law distributions are to be used more prevalently than initially thought.
Ë Can we separate the two domains along the rules of tangibility/subjectivity of the probabilistic measurement? Daniel Kahneman 
had a saying about measuring future states: how can one “measure” something that does not exist?  So we could use:
Ë Regime 1: elements entailing forecasting and “measuring” future risks.  So should we use time as a dividing criterion: 
Anything that has time in it (meaning involves a forecast of future states) needs to fall into the first regime of non-declining 
proportional uncertainty parameters a(i).
Ë Regime 2: conventional statistical measurements of matters patently thin-tailed, say as in conventional sampling theory, with 
a strong a priori acceptance of the methods without any form of skepticism.
Ë We can even work backwards, using the behavior of the estimation errors a(n) < a(1) or a(n) ¥ a(1) as a way to separate 
uncertainties.
Note 1
Infinite variance is not a problem at all -- yet economists have been historically scared of it.  All we have to do is avoid using
variance and measures in the L2  norm.  For instance we can do much of what we currently do (even price financial derivatives) by
using mean absolute deviation of the random variable, E[|x|] in place of s, so long as the tail exponent of the power law exceeds 1
(Taleb, 2008). 
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Note 2
There  is  most  certainly  a  cognitive  dimension,  rarely  (or,  I  believe,  never)  addressed  or  investigated,  in  the  following  mental
shortcomings that, from the research, appears to be common among probability modelers:
Ë Inability (or, perhaps, as the cognitive science literature seems to now hold, lack of motivation) to perform higher order 
recursions among a certain class of people (I know that he knows that I know that he knows...). See the second edition of The 
Black Swan, Taleb (2010).
Ë Inability (or lack of motivation) to transfer from one situation to another (similar to the problem of weakness of central 
coherence). For instance, a researcher can accept power laws in one domain yet not recognize them in another, not integrating 
the ideas (lack of central coherence). I have observed this total lack of central coherence with someone who can do stochastic 
volatility models but is unable to understand them outside the exact same conditions when doing other papers.
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